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Non-Communist Affidavits: Taft-
Hartley Sound and Fury
Gerald B. Greenwald*
The inclusion of Section 9 (h) in the Taft-Hartley Act was
paradoxical. Under that subsection union officers are required
to execute affidavits disavowing membership in or affiliation
with the Communist Party and belief in forcible overthrow of
the government. Execution of such an affidavit is a condition
precedent to union participation in National Labor Relations
Board proceedings involving matters of representation and unfair
labor practices.' The statutory pattern of the Wagner Act, while
* B.A., University of Chicago 1948; J.D., University of Chicago Law School
1951; member of the Illinois Bar.
1. The affidavit requirement was held constitutional in American Com-
munications Associatior v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Osman v. Douds, 339
U.S. 846 (1950). "No investigation shall be made by the Board of any ques-
tion affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised
by a labor, organization under subsection (c) of this section [filing of peti-
tions for certification and decertification proceedings],* and no complaint
shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under
subsection (b) 'of Section 10 [filing of unfair labor practice complaints],
unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously
or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor
organization and the officers of any national or international labor organiza-
tion of which: it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member
of the Communist Party or afffliated with such party, and that he does not
believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes
in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by
any illegal or unconstitutional methods. The provisions of section 35(a) of
the Criminal Code shall be applicable to such affidavits." Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, § 9(h), 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(h) (Supp. 1951),
hereinafter cited as LMRA. The subsection was amended by Act of October
22, 1951, Pub. L. 189, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., which deleted the words, "no peti-
tion under Section 9(e)(1) shall be entertained" (see asterisk), reflecting
elimination of the union security contract election requirement in the original
Taft-Hartley Act.
Denial of NLRB facilities severely limits the non-complying union's
reliance on state labor boards. The board has held that a state's failure to
impose filing restrictions comparable to Section 9(h) precluded cession of
NLRB jurisdiction to a state board under Section 10(e) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, and refused to give effect to a state labor board representation election
won by a non-complying union. Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corp., 80 NLRB 1050
(1948). A state board has refused its processes to a non-complying union.
Eau Claire Press Co., 21 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1947). An interstate employer suc-
ceeded in enjoining another state board from certifying a non-complying
union as the exclusive bargaining representative. Linde Air Products Co.,
77 F. Supp. 656 (D.C. Minn. 1948).
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preserving the right to strike and lock-out, strongly promoted the
peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by orderly administra-
tive processes. The amendatory Taft-Hartley Act, though it
expresses a far less optimisitc mood, reaffirmed its predecessor's
desire for governmental stabilization of labor-management
relations.
In contrast, Section -9(h), by denying NLRB facilities to
non-complying unions, fosters a certain measure of reliance on
economic coercion, with its resulting industrial unrest. Non-
compliants are required to act forcibly to gain many of the
objectives achieved peacefully by their rivals. The legitimation
of economic coercion as a tactic of non-complying unions was
assured by the Taft-Hartley Act's failure in any way to abridge
the right of labor organizations to strike or picket for otherwise
lawful objectives.2 Effectiveness of economic coercion depends
ultimately upon the firmness of muscle which responds to union
flexing. Under the present statutory scheme evaluation of NLRB
policy must stress those areas which affect the development of
the non-complying labor organization's economic power.
The essential paradox was accompanied by uncomfortable
perplexity. In a single act, Congress provided elaborate mechan-
isms to insure peaceful development in labor-management rela-
tions, only to withdraw such mechanisms from a single group of
active participants in the labor scene. Congress unfortunately
left undefined the paramount issue of just how much was given,
and how much taken away. Usual indications of legislative intent
were obscured by virtue of the subsection's origin.3 The present
affidavit requirement first appeared in the conference bill, and
2. "Nothing of this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that
right." NLRA § 13, 29 U.S.C.A. § 163 (Supp. 1951). (Italics supplied.) Section
8(b)(4)(c) provides that strikes in defiance of an existing certification are
unlawful. Even this limitation may be qualified. Such a strike was not held
unlawful where the strikers sought to compel the employer to bargain on
matters not settled by an existing collective bargaining contract with the
certified representative. Douds v. Local 1250, Retail Wholesale Department
Store Union, 173 F. 2d 764 (2d Cir. 1948). But several state courts have used
Section 9(h) as a ground upon which to enjoin strikes and picketing of
non-complying unions. Scranton Broadcasters, Inc. v. American Communica-
tions Association, 13 CCH Lab. Cases (Pa.) 1 64,124 (1947); Fulford v. Smith
Cabinet Manufacturing Co., 118 Ind. App. 326, 77 N.E. 2d 755 (1948).
3. The original House bill contained no provision for the filing of affi-
davits, but forbade certification of a union if one or more of its officers was
a member of the Communist Party or believed in or supported teaching
forceable overthrow of the government. Consult H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1947), § 9(f)(6).
NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVITS
remained unchanged in the final Taft-Hartley Act. The secrecy
of conference sessions, the relatively slight mention of Section
9 (h) in ensuing debate, and the haste with which the compromise
bill was passed all contribute to minimize the reliability of any
claim to clear congressional intent.
Discussion of board affidavit policy will clearly reveal the
ambiguous draftsmanship of Section 9 (h). But there is a valu-
able lesson implicit in this long trail of intra-statutory conflict.
The difficulty of designing legislation which immobilizes a small
but active segment of the labor movement without weakening
organized labor as a whole should be recognized at the outset.
The following examination seeks to answer two basic questions.
First, was the affidavit requirement designed so as to eliminate
opportunities for circumvention of its proscriptions? Second,
has the statutory denial of board facilities to non-compliants
reduced the industrial impact of politically suspect unions?
CIRCUMVENTION OF SECTION 9 (H)
Sanctions against non-compliance with the affidavit require-
ment appear formidable and easily suggest situations in which
employers or rival unions would desire to establish the non-
compliance of a labor organization in order to frustrate its objec-
tives. Compliance procedure is controlled by the board, which
early assumed that "in view of the language [of Section 9 (h)
which precluded] the Board from investigating any question
concerning the representation of employees where the require-
ments have not been met, the matter of compliance is clearly one
for the Board to determine in any manner suited to the circum-
stances." 4 The manner found best suited to the circumstances
was one which avoided delay and confusion of issues in board
proceedings. Compliance was declared an administrative matter
not litigable before the NLRB by the parties in either a complaint
or representation proceeding.5 However, information concerning
compliance can be brought directly to the administrative atten-
tion of the board, and might stimulate reconsideration of thq
union's status.6 In supporting the board's view, the courts have
indicated that evidence of non-compliance may be presented in
a judicial enforcement proceeding of a board order, since the
4. Lion Oil Co., 76 NLRB 565 (1948).
5. Shawnee Milling Co., 82 NLRB 1266 (1949).
6. Sunbeam Corp., 94 NLRB 844, No. 134, C.C.H. Lab. Law Rep. (4th Ed.)
10,849, hereinafter cited CCH (1951).
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issue of compliance directly challenges the board's jurisdiction to
grant relief.7 Although the board was easily able to eliminate
attendant delay, it could not evade the more difficult problem of
devising policies which would defeat union attempts to circum-
vent the affidavit requirement itself.
Frustration of the statutory purpose implicit in Section 9 (h)
might proceed on either of two levels. Formal compliance with
the filing requirements may conceal continued Communist leader-
ship. In the alternative, the use of "compliants" and persons not
covered by the language of 9 (h) to further the goals of non-
complying unions could render the sanctions of the act largely
ineffective. This latter conduct is known as "fronting." The
former method encompasses outright perjury, and the more
subtle technique of modifying union structure to remove union
leaders from the burdensome class of "officers," thus excluding
them from the literal scope of Section 9 (h).
The board has consistently refused to inquire into the truth
or falsity of affidavits on the ground that the subsection's criminal
sanction makes this a question for the Department of Justice.8
In taking this position the board finds support in congressional
debate of the subsection's proponents.9 But it becomes increas-
ingly evident that the language of Section 9 (h) has been so
drafted as to make successful perjury prosecution nearly impos-
sible. The justice department must establish that at the time of
the, making of his affidavit the affiant was a nfember or affiliate
of the Communist Party, or believed in and supported forceful
overthrow of the government. Congressional desire to encourage
labor leaders' disavowal of communist ideology disregarded
consideration of conduct immediately prior to execution as an
index of affiant's sincerity. Further, in the light of sub rosa
party operation, proof of membership or affiliation after the date
7. NLRB v. Greenboro Coca Cola Bottling Co., 180 F. 2d 840 (4th Cir.
1950).
8. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 86 NLRB 428 (1949); American Seat-
ing Co., 85 NLRB 269 (1949); Sunbeam Corp., 89 NLRB 469 (1950).
• 9. In congressional debate Senator Taft explained, "This provision [Sec-
tion 9(h)] making the filing of affidavits with respect to Communist Party
affiliation by its officers a condition precedent to use of the processes of the
Board has been criticized as creating endless delays. It was to prevent such
delays that this provision was amended by the conferees. Under both the
Senate and House bills the Board's certification proceedings could have been
infinitely delayed while it investigated and determined Communist Party
affiliation. Under the amendment an affidavit is sufficient for the Board's
purpose and there is no delay unless an olificer of the moving union refuses
to file the affidavit required." 93 Cong. Rec. 7002 (1947). Cf. 93 Cong. Rec.
6602, 04 (1947).
410 [VOL. XII
1952] NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVITS 411
of affidavit execution is particularly difficult to establish. In
publicly criticizing the subsection, former Attorney General
McGrath has cited the development of simple devices which
successfully avoided the consequences of the statute.'0 In one
case an affiant, apparently immune from perjury prosecution,
resigned from the Communist Party and publicly announced his
continued adherence to Communist doctrines and his right to
advocate them." Publicity attendant on such notorious recanta-
tions demoralized administration of the act. Only recently has
the attorney general recommended to Congress a solution which
would in his opinion permit effective challenge of the veracity of
Section 9 (h) affidavits.' 2 For four years the subsection's criminal
perjury sanction has been a sham. The board refused to examine
affidavits; the attorney general deemed himself unable to prose-
cute doubtful affiants.'3 From the first, serious doubt was cast upon
the effectiveness of Section 9 (h).
The practice of redesignating certain union offices as admin-
istrative positions without changing their union leadership duties
was a common means of effecting formal compliance with 9 (h)
requirements. When A.F.L. vice-president John L. Lewis refused
to execute an affidavit, the federation, in convention, voted to
10. New York Times, p. 17, col. 3 (July 1, 1951).
11. New York Times, pp. 1, 7 (June 6, 1949). See also New York Times pp.
7 (August 16, 1949) and 20 (September 8, 1950). In a sharp dissent Board
Member Gray challenged his colleagues' failure to apply "appropriate admin-
istrative sanctions" where such publicity accompanied execution of the affi-
davit. "If as I believe to be the case, the public statement contradicts the
affidavit, we are not required to give effect to the affidavit.... To me as a
member of this Board charged with the administration of the Act, the
effrontery of the Union's officer is too offensive, too subversive of the objec-
tives of this Act to permit his conduct to go unnoticed." In a footnote to
his dissent Gray commented: "It is difficult to imagine any more open invi-
tation to circumvention of the Act than the position taken by the majority in
the present case." American Seating Co., 85 NLRB 269, 275-76 (1949).
12. The attorney general proposed the following addition to Section 9(h):
"and that for the preceding twelve-month period he has not been a member
of the Communist Party, or affiliated with such party, and has not believed
in or been a memnber of or supported any organization that believes in or
teaches the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any
illegal or unconstitutional methods." New York Times, note 10, supra.
13. Affidavits suspected of being false were sent to the Department of
Justice by the board. NLRB, Release R-202 (June 14, 1949). "Recurring
reports of Department of Justice action on the twenty-five or thirty question-
able affidavits have proved groundless, to date." Shair, How Effective Is the
Non-Communist Affidavit?, 1 CCH Lab. Law J. 935, 942 (1950). Consult Levin-
son, Left-Wing Labor and the Taft-Hartley Act, 1 CCH Lab. Law J. 1079, 1090
(1950). The NLRB has made fifty-five referrals of suspect affidavits to the
Department of Justice since 1947. Statement of NLRB, presented by Chair-
man Paul M. Herzog at Hearings of Senate Sub-Committee of Labor and
Labor Management Relations, on Communist Domination of Certain Unions
(March 18, 1952).
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abolish the offices of vice-president, although "former" vice-
presidents" retained their place as members of the A.F.L. execu-
tive board. 14 But more often, union changes which occurred
involved officers far left of John L. Lewis. Initially, the board
held itself concerned merely with formal compliance, refusing
to by-pass the affidavit and examine union structure. 15 Subse-
quently, however, the board appeared so shocked by such a
redesignation as to cause their issuance of a rule to show cause
why certain members should not be deemed officers, thus pre-
venting union compliance status.16 The resulting hearing in
which the union failed to make the required showing dramatically
illustrated the adverse effects of board concentration on mere
formal compliance without regard to union structure. NLRB
procedure was hastily amended to require affidavits from all
persons reasonably considered officers regardless of their organi-
zational position.'
7
The second, and potentially more damaging, form of eluding
statutory sanctions is "fronting." Here the labor organization
seeking access to the board obtains its objectives without effecting
affidavit compliance. Rather it depends upon the assistance of
compliants or persons not subject to 9 (h) proscriptions. Thus the
board's primary concern lies in defining the true party, looking
behind the formal petitioner to determine the interest which
would most benefit from operation of government processes.
14. Levinson, supra note 13, at 1085.
15. "The contentions made by the respondent illustrate the possibility
under existing law that unions, by abolishing offices under their constitu-
tions but assigning identical duties to officials who shall no longer be denom-
inated as 'officers,' may frustrate the Congressional intent to drive Com-
munists from positions of leadership in the labor movement. As the Board
reads the statute, however, these considerations cannot properly deter it from
processing a case when the statutory requirements have been met." Crad-
dock-Terry Shoe Corp., 76 NLRB 842, 843 (1948).
16. The union failed to make its showing, but was subsequently declared
in compliance when the member in question filed an affidavit. NLRB, Fif-
teenth Annual Report 21 (1950).
17. "In determining who Is occupying an office and must, therefore, file
an affidavit as an 'oficer,' the Board will normally rely upon the designation
of offices appearing in the constitution of the labor organization. Where,
however, the Board has reasonable cause to believe that a labor organization
has omitted from its constitution the designation of any position as an office
for the purpose of evading or circumventing the filing requirements of sec-
tion 9 (h) of the act, the Board may require affidavits from additional per-
sons." 29 Code Fed. Regs. S.102.13 (c) (Cum. Supp. 1950). Upon reexamination
of a local's union compliance status, NLRB resolved an ambiguity in the
local's constitution by references to the constitution of its international,
holding that the local improperly failed to designate certain members as
officers. Consequently, the local was not, and had never been, in compliance.
Local 1150, United Electrical Workers, 96 NLRB, No. 164, CCH U 11,199 (1951).
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Early statutory construction by the NLRB insured that this
inquiry would be crucial in a substantial number of situations.
Reading Section 9 (h) literally, the board concluded that the
filing requirement was applicable only to labor organizations
and not to individuals seeking board access.'8 While the board
was unquestionably on strong ground, the effect of its construc-
tion was to permit individual labor union members that free
access to board facilities which the clear language of Section 9 (h)
denied to their non-complying labor organizations. The statutory
scope of individual employee activity had been defined without
reference to Section 9(h) considerations. Any individual may
seek representation status on the mere showing that such status
is sought for purposes of collective bargaining.19 He may initiate
decertification proceedings" or bring unfair labor practice charges
in protection of statutory 'rights of employees under the act.21
Thus the act permitted individual employee action in all basic
areas of NLRB operation. It was inevitable that the wide scope,
of individual rights coupled with a corresponding exemption
from the affidavit requirement would give rise to frequent alle-
gations of fronting and circumvention in all types of board
proceedings.
Frequently, individual members of non-complying unions
sought intervention in representation proceedings initiated by
rival complying unions. This created a troublesome situation since
Section 9 (h) barred the non-complying union itself from partici-
pation, irrespective of its membership strength in the unit. If
the individual intervenor belonged to a non-complying union
which included a majority of the unit's employees, his victory
as exclusive bargaining representative seemed assured. If, on
the other hand, his union had minority membership, the inter-
venor, campaigning in his individual capacity, would seek to
attract sufficient non-union votes to win the election. Assuming
that an employee-member is genuinely interested in representing
fellow employees, his election does not concern our discussion
of Section 9 (h). But victory by an individual fronting for his
18. Acme Boot Manufacturing Co., 76 NLRB 441 (1948).
19. Hofmann Packing Co., 87 NLRB 601 (1949).
20. National Labor Relations Act, § 9(c) (1) (A), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(c)(1) (A) (Supp. 1951), herein-
after cited NLRA.
21. NLRA §§ 7, 8(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157, 158(a) (Supp. 1951). The effect
of Section 9(h) upon disposition of individually initiated unfair labor practice
proceedings is discussed in detail at p. 422 et seq.
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non-complying union would seriously frustrate the operation of
the act. In so far as the individual's representative status is used
to advance the policies of his union it is the non-complying union
itself which has benefited from the board proceeding. The board
is under a duty to assure that certification of an individual
employee, which is lawful, is not in fact tantamount to certifica-
tion of a non-complying union. The board investigates the would-
be intervenor's conduct with painstaking care, relying largely on
whether he solicited authorizations from employees in his own
behalf or in that of his union. Where the board makes a finding
of fronting, the petition for intervention is, of course, dismissed.22
Initiation of decertification proceedings by individual mem-
bers of non-complying unions raises much the same problem. A
non-complying union might attempt to destroy the exclusive
representation status of a certified rival union as a prelude to
asserting its own demand for recognition. Early board cases
summarily rejected allegations that individual petitioners were
fronting for non-complying unions on the ground that the desire
of employees was paramount and could be best ascertained by
the ensuing election.23 This policy clearly reflected congressional
intent behind the act's decertification provision. 24 Although em-
ployees' desires concerning exclusive representation should be
respected, it contradicts the language and spirit of Section 9 (h)
to subject a compliant union to board administered decertifica-
tion at the behest of persons acting in the interests of a rival
non-complying labor organization. Board action in these cases
was clearly inconsistent with rigorous application of the real-
party-in-interest rationale in representation proceedings, since
decertification proceedings equally raise questions of representa-
tion subject to the requirements of Section 9 (h). In order to
effectuate the policies of the subsection, limitations upon individ-
ual origination of decertification was required. With uncharacter-
istic tranquillity the board subsequently adopted this view,
reversing its ground without explanation or dissent. Successive
22. Campbell Soup Co., 76 NLRB 950 (1948); Oppenheim-Collins & Co.,
Inc., 79 NLRB 435 (1948). While intervention was the common pattern, the
same situation would arise where individual members of non-complying
unions initiated representation proceedings.
23. Whitin Machine Works, 76 NLRB 998 (1948); Auburn Rubber Corp.,
85 NLRB 545 (1949); Radix Wire Co., 86 NLRB 105 (1949). Cf. Allied Chem-
ical and Dye Corp., 78 NLRB 408 (1948), where petitioner's office-holding in
a rival non-complying union shortly after filing for decertiflcation of the
incumbent union was insufficient evidence of fronting.
24. NLRA § 9(c)(1)(A), note 22, supra. Consult Senate Report No. 105,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1947), p. 10.
[VOL. XII
NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVITS
cases rejected individual petitions relying upon evidence of
employee conduct in behalf of his non-complying union.25 The
forces which caused NLRB vacillation reflect the extensive con-
flict between 9 (h) and other sections of the act which pervade
board affidavit policy. Implicit in reversal is recognition of the
conflict between Section 9 (c) (1) (A) solicitude for employees' de-
sires as to their representatives and the lending of board processes
to bolster the strategic position of non-complying unions in oppo-
sition to Section 9 (h) proscriptions. Thus the board has been
placed in the delicate position of determining the area of policy
which is to be favored. In choosing to stress 9 (h) considerations
the board has made consistent its efforts to prevent the favored
position of individuals from immunizing non-complying labor
organizations in all proceedings raising questions of represen-
tation.
More difficult issues of fronting were raised by virtue of the
federated structure of American trade unionism. Although local
unions normally engage in collective bargaining for employees,
international unions with which they are affiliated have been
anxious to step in and seek certification in place of their non-
complying locals. Their objective is easily understandable. Cer-
tification of the international union would assure members of the
non-complying local affiliate of continued participation, or at the
least, representation, in collective bargaining. Local membership
would be preserved, and with it the economic strength of both
the local and international unions. Employers and rival unions
have steadily objected to this practice. It was forcefully argued
that since local unions invariably deal with employers, the non-
complying local involved may be presumed to continue as an
interested party even where its international formally negotiated
the collective bargaining agreement which results from interna-
tional certification. Initially, the board refused to apply familiar
fronting criteria in such situations.26 Later, however, the board
agreed to look behind the international's petition for certification
and consider such factors as bargaining limitations contained in
the international's constitution, 27 the purpose of the interna-
tional in initiating its petition,28 and the collective bargaining
25. Knife River Coal Mining Co., 91 NLRB 176 (1950); Hammond Bag &
Paper Co., 94 NLRB, No. 147, CCH 1 10,866 (1951).
26. Warshawsky & Co., 75 NLRB 1291 (1948); Lion Oil Co., 76 NLRB 565
(1948).
27. United States Gypsum Co., 77 NLRB 1098 (1948).
28. Lane-Wells Co., 77 NLRP 1051 (1948).
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history of the non-complying local.29 Denial of international peti-
tions on the ground of fronting for non-complying local affiliates
often followed such inquiries.
Another board shift was heralded by the important second
Lane-Wells Company case which grew out of a non-compliance
situation, though it did not involve that issue. On evidence of a
non-complying local's interest in a representation proceeding the
board initially denied the parent international's petition for certi-
fication.80 Shortly thereafter the board learned of the local's
compliance prior to its decision, and by supplemental decision
thereafter directed the requested election.8' Notwithstanding the
local's demonstrated interest the board permitted the interna-
tional, alone, to seek certification as exclusive bargaining agent,
ostensibly on the ground that the local's compliance extinguished
any possibility of evasion of Section 9 (h). But two board mem-
bers, dissenting, urged that either the local be substituted for the
international, or, at least, that both participate as joint parties in
interest. The dissenters then argued that it is unrealistic to be-
lieve that international unions will ever be the sole party in inter-
est in units in which they maintain local affiliates, an argument
which was unanimously rejected by those members in early cases.
Recognition of this fact required local certification, for "Participa-
tion in grievance procedures traditionally has been a matter pecu-
liarly of interest to and within the grasp of local union officers
and members." 82
The majority agreed that if the local affiliate was, in fact,
to participate in collective bargaining, the board may exercise its
power to recall the international's certification. 8 In reaching its
decision the majority obviously relied upon legislative intent
inherent in congressional rejection of a proposed amendatory
section "that would have severely limited our authority to certify
29. Oppenheim-Collins & Co., Inc., 79 NLRB 435 (1948); Lynchburg Gas
Co., 80 NLRB 1237 (1948); International Harvester Co., 80 NLRB 1279 (1948).
30. Lane-Wells Co., 77 NLRB 1051 (1948).
31. Lane-Wells Co., 79 NLRB 252 (1948).
32. Id. at 259.
33. "The Board has the power to police its own certifications and can
thereby fully effectuate the policies of Section 9(f) (g) and (h). If changing
circumstances should give rise to a situation in which the Board for policy
reasons would not issue a certification in the first instance, it has power,
either on its own motion or that of the employer, to recall the certificate."
Id, at 256. See Section 10(d) wherein board modification of its orders and
findings is expressly permitted. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(d) (Supp. 1951). Cramp




national or international labor organizations and would have
meant the certification of local unions only, except in a very
narrow area." 34 In so doing, the board affirmed employees' statu-
tory rights "to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing." 35
Shortly thereafter, Prudential Insurance Company 36 reversed
NLRB policy in earlier fronting cases and fostered another divi-
sion of board opinion. Expanding the Lane-Wells cases beyond
recognition, the majority declared, "[W]e believe that these cases
stand for the proposition that where there is in existence a
local having members in the appropriate unit, its compliance is
required without regard to the extent to which it may participate
in collective bargaining. In any event, we believe that such a
doctrine is required in order to effectuate the policy of Section
9(f) (g) and (h) of the Act." 37 Alongside the Prudential rule,
the vitality of the Lane-Wells holding, which permits exclusive
certification of international unions with (complying) local affili-
ates having members in the unit, continues unabated.88
It is elementary that certification of an international union
strengthens its affiliated local in the unit. The power of a local
union lies in its ability to influence, the terms and conditions of
its members' employment. Even though the international union
formally negotiates the collective bargaining contract, its terms
must reflect demands of employee-members of the local. Where
the local remains non-compliant at the time of its international's
certification, it has gained strength through the operation of board
processes, a result formerly rejected by the board in early 9 (h)
cases. The Prudential rule, though a marked departure from
prior cases, was justified as a legitimate extension of fronting
34. Lane-Wells Co., supra note 33, at 255.
35. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (Supp. 1951).
36. 81 NLRB 295 (1949).
37. Id. at 297. Although subsequent cases relied upon record evidence of
the non-complying local's joint interest in any contract ultimately achieved
by its International (U.S. Gypsum Co., 81 NLRB 292 [1949]; Empire Furniture
Manufacturing Co., 82 NLRB 427 [1949]; Wells Manufacturing Corp., 85
NLRB 23 [1949]) the rule of the Prudential case was unanimously affirmed,
and continues as board policy. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 82 NLRB
179 (1949). But the board permitted a complying international's petition for
certification in the absence of evidence that its non-complying local with
members in the unit had any interest in the proceeding, relying upon board
power to police its certifications. The opinion, written by a three-man board
which included Chairman Herzog, did not mention the Prudential rule.
Manistee Salt Works, 85 NLRB 147 (1949). Cf. Minneapolis Knitting Works,
84 NLRB 826 (1949).
38. General Motors Corp., 88 NLRB 450 (1950); Sunbeam Corp., 89 NLRB
469 (1950).
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doctrine. But implicit in this -requirement that every affiliated
local with unit members comply regardless of its bargaining role
prior to certification of the international union is the sub silentio
acceptance of the Lane-Wells minority premise that a local is
inevitably "interested" in any certification obtained by its inter-
national. Logically, then, the local should assume responsibility
commensurate with its interest and become a required party to
certification as joint bargaining agent. This result is denied by
the Lane-Wells board's solicitude for seeming congressional desire
that employees be free to select an international union as sole
bargaining agent if they so choose. The NLRB has assumed an
anomalous position. While the local and its petitioning interna-
tional are treated as joint applicants for the use of board facili-
ties, resulting in required compliance of both, the NLRB aban-
dons the "real party in interest" criterion in the later stage of
certification, certifying the international union as sole bargaining
agent.3 9 The dilemma observed in reading the Lane-Wells and
Prudential cases together is the price paid for strict board enforce-
ment of legislative intent implicit in the conflicting policies of
Sections 7 and 9 (h).4
39. The party-in-interest rationale pervades almost all other fronting
situations. Where the international union petitioner plans to establish a local
in the unit upon achieving its own certification, the board characterizes
employer demands that the future local should comply as "premature" on
the ground that at the time of certification the international is the only
Interested party. Granite Textile Mills, Inc., 76 NLRB 613 (1948); Cribben &
Sexton Co., 82 NLRB 1409 (1949). Likewise organizing committees are not
required to file afdavits in proceedings initiated by complying international
or local unions where activities of organizing committees cease upon grant-
ing of recognition and do not extend into the area of collective bargaining.
Mississippi Products, Inc., 78 NLRB 873 (1948); Tin Processing Corp., 80
NLRB 1369 (1948). Contra, where an organizing council had a non-complying
member who previously attempted to organize employees in the same unit.
Sampsel Time Control, Inc., 80 NLRB 1250 (1948).
40. Another indication of this quandary can be found in the cases. When
a compliant international union shows an interest in representing employees
which are not usually included within its jurisdiction, employers have con-
tended that certification is sought in behalf of a non-complying international
which is barred from the proceeding. The board apathetically reminded
employers that they are obligated to bargain only with the, certified union.
Stokely Foods, Inc., 83 NLRB 795 (1949); Morrison Turning Co., Inc., 83
NLRB 687 (1949). But where the employer alleged that a petitioning inter-
national intends to use its certification in the interests of a non-compliant
local affiliate, the board emphasizes its power to withdraw certification in
the event of subterfuge. Oppenheim-Collins Co., Inc., 79 NLRB 435 (1948);
Manistee Salt Works, 85 NLRB 147 (1949); Minneapolis Knitting Works,
84 NLRB 826 (1949). The board obviously recognizes that it is unrealistic
to tell an employer that he need not bargain with a non-complying local
whose international union is the certified representative.
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BOARD POLICY IN MATTERS OF REPRESENTATION
Although Section 9 (h) denies a non-compliant's participation
in any representation proceeding, the board has apparently rea-
soned that it does not serve as a bar to participation in activity
auxiliary to, but not a part of, NLRB proceedings. Accordingly,
non-compliants are permitted to campaign freely against the elec-
tion and consequent certification of a rival union.41 The non-
compliant has been provided with a vehicle for maintaining its
command of economic resources, since the advantage derived
from defeat of rival certification is substantial. Under the act,
the non-complying union is insulated from another certification
contest for at least one year.42 The employer, of course, remains
free to refuse negotiation of a collective bargaining contract with
any union. If the failure of rivals to gain a majority in the elec-
tion is due to a lack of employee enthusiasm for unionization, the
employer's refusal will be decisive. But if the defeat of certifica-
tion indicates the vigor and support of the barred non-complying
union, the employer's freedom to refuse the non-compliant's
demands for recognition might be severely curtailed.43
The anomaly is apparent. Theoretically the election includes
all lawful candidates, and the non-compliant is denied an oppor-
tunity to compete for statutory certification. But defeat of rival
certification might operate both as insulation from further rival
challenges and as a vehicle for establishing the non-compliant's
strength, and ultimately the employer's voluntary recognition. In
another context, the board has recognized that, for all practical
purposes, employer recognition and bargaining are tantamount
to NLRB certification as exclusive representative. 44 Both crystal-
lize a continuing relation between the employer and his em-
ployees' union. In the case of certification the board stands ready
41. Woodmark Industries, Inc., 80 NLRB 1105 (1948).
42. NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(c)(3) (Supp. 1951). Cf. Mengel Co.,
80 NLRB 705 (1948).
43. It has been suggested that, in fact, the strength of a non-compliant
is largely dissipated by the effort expended to achieve voluntary employer
recognition, the loss being reflected in the terms of the contract itself. "An
employer's grant of recognition to a majority union, when the right to recog-
nition is unenforceable by law, has no value as a bargaining point. Once this
right became a matter of the employer's grace in the case of non-complying
unions, its granting assumed importance and value to the union, with the
frequent result that such a union often modified substantially other collective
bargaining demands to assure the continuation of its contractual right to
recognition through a signed collective bargaining agreement." Kearns,
Non-Communist Affidavits Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 37 Geo. L. J. 297, 304
(1948).
44. Marshall and Bruce Co., 75 NLRB 90 (1947).
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to enforce the relationship against the resistance of either party.
Voluntary recognition tends to reflect the same coercive stability,
since the fruits of the non-compliant's economic strength, the
collective bargaining contract, is lawful, and fully enforceable
against either party in judicial proceedings. 45 The Taft-Hartley
Act permits suits for violation of collective bargaining contracts
and recovery of damages sustained by reason of the breach. Sec-
tion 9(h) merely denies the non-compliant's access to board
processes; it does not affect the jurisdiction of the federal district
court to protect rights afforded under Section 301 of the act.40
The collective bargaining contract, once achieved, operates
to immunize the union from statutory consequences of its non-
compliance. This result follows from the board's view that "The
stability of labor relations that the statute seeks to accomplish
by the encouragement of the collective bargaining process ulti-
mately depends upon the channelization of the collective bargain-
ing relationship within the framework of the collective agree-
ment, and the adherence thereto by both employers and em-
ployees." 47 A non-compliant may become party to such a con-
tract by virtue of certification acquired prior to the effective date
of the Taft-Hartley Act, or during a period of compliance, pres-
ently lapsed,48 or through voluntary negotiation following its
successful request for recognition. Again, in this sphere, both
compliants and non-compliants reap identical benefits from NLRB
policy.49 In Reed Roller Bit Company,5" the board established the
45. Consult letter by Labor Solicitor Tyson to the Secretary of Labor,
January 23, 1948, reprinted at 21 LRRM 62. United Public Workers v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 16 CCH Lab. Cases ff 64,998 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook Cty.; 1949),
upholds such a contract.
46. LMRA § 301(a) and § 303(b), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185(a), 187(b) (Supp. 1951).
Cf. United Steel Workers v. Shakespeare Co., 84 F. Supp. 267 (D.C. Mich.
1949). See Reed v. Fawick Airflex Co., 86 F. Supp. 822 (D.C. Ohio 1949);
United Auto Workers v. Wilson Athletic Sporting Goods Manufacturing Co.,
No. 49C1533, June 21, 1950, 18 CCH Lab. Cases 1 65,867. Also, the inclusion of
arbitration provisions within the contract provides another means of enforc-
ing contract terms without dependence upon NLRB remedial facilities.
47. United Electric Corp., 84 NLRB 768, 773 (1949).
48. Section 9(h) requires the execution of an appropriate affidavit "within
the preceding twelve-month period." Thus an affidavit assures compliance
for only one year. New officers must file immediately upon their election;
old dficers must renew their affidavits annually. NLRB, Fifteenth Annual
Report 17 (1950).
49. The board has been criticized on the ground that "the statutory effect
of non-compliance seems to indicate clearly that Congress was not concerned
with stability of a non-complying union's bargaining relationship." Note,
64 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 794 (1951).
50. 72 NLRB 927 (1947). Cf. Chandler and Price Co., Case No. 8-RC-299,
Ad. Dec. of NLRB, CCH § 8578 (1948). Contracts of greater than two years
duration bar representation proceedings for two years. Puritan Ice Co., 74
NLRB 1311 (1947).
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rule that a two-year contract will ordinarily be considered of
reasonable duration, and constitute a bar to NLRB representation
proceedings throughout its term. Accordingly the board permits
a non-complying union's intervention in representation proceed-
ings initiated by a rival to enable the non-compliant to assert its
contract as a bar to the proceedings.5 1 The non-compliant must
initially establish its contractual interest. Once permitted inter-
vention, the union participates freely in the proceeding. As the
board has stated, assertion of its contract as a bar raises complex
issues which makes it impractifal to limit the scope of interven-
tion.52 Where the non-compliant is successful, the rival petition
is dismissed; if assertion of the bar fails, the representation elec-
tion is ordered, and the intervenor, by virtue of its non-compli-
ance, is denied a place on the ballot.53
The board has long justified its elaborate contract-bar policy
as necessitated by the act's encouragement of both stable indus-
trial relations essential to effective collective bargaining and em-
ployees' free selection of bargaining representatives. Existence
of a contract requires the board to weigh clashing interests in the
balance. Application of the contract-bar policy to non-complying
unions is indefensible in terms of this rationale. As noted at the
outset, the most conspicuous feature of statutory affidavit policy
is the withdrawal of mechanisms for stability and peaceful settle-
ment of disputes from non-compliants. In this regard Section
9 (h) has neutralized the conflict, thus encouraging full freedom
of certain employees to select and change their representatives
at will.
Board policies, developed in proceedings instituted to decer-
tify a non-complying union certified prior to the act or during a
period of compliance which subsequently lapsed, also tend to
insulate the non-compliant from disadvantageous statutory con-
51. Heyden Chemical Corp., 85 NLRB 1181 (1949). Northern Indiana Public
Service Co., 91 NLRB 172 (1950). Ford Motor Co., 95 NLRB, No. 27, reversed,
95 NLRB, No. 121 (1951), indicates the difficulty in asserting a contract bar.
52. American Chain & Cable Co., Case No. 4-R-2752, Ad. Dec. of NLRB
digested at CCH Lab. Law Rep. 1 6356 (3d ed. 1948). Cf. Aluminum Co. of
America, 85 NLRB 915 (1949).
53. Norcal Packing Co., 76 NLRB 254 (1948). In Woodmark Industries,
Inc., 80 NLRB 1105 (1948), the board invalidated write-in ballots cast in the
representation election in favor of the non-complying union "lest there be
accomplished indirectly that which the union itself could not have accom-
plished directly." In the absence of a contractual interest, a non-complying
union may not object to any aspect of the proceeding. Dadourian Export
Corp., 80 NLRB 1400 (1948); H. 0. Canfield Co., 80 NLRB 1027 (1948).
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sequences.5 4 The certified non-complying union is a necessary
party to decertification proceedings and is entitled to full par-
ticipation in the decertification election.55 But should the non-
complying union maintain its majority, Section 9(h) precludes
the board from approving its certification. The NLRB will merely
certify the arithmetical results of the election unless the union
makes timely compliance. 6 Although the non-complying union
is unable to maintain its status as exclusive bargaining represen-
tative, certification of a rival union has been avoided for at least
one year under statutory policy which makes election results
binding for that period. 7 As in the certification proceeding dis-
cussed above, the majority non-complying union is in a much
better strategic position to demand effectively employer's volun-
tary recognition than defeated minority compliants. The strate-
gic advantage gained by non-compliants who have successfully
weathered a decertification proceeding and prevented rival cer-
tification indicates the importance of strict application of fronting
criteria to individual decertification petitions. Under board policy
the non-compliant's role in bona fide decertification proceedings
instituted by others is substantial. At the very least, the non-
compliant must be prevented from manipulating the initiation
of decertification proceedings so as to maximize its own bargain-
ing advantage.58
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS
Section 9 (h) specifically denies the issuance of an NLRB
complaint arising out of an unfair labor practice charge filed by
a non-complying union. By this technique Congress apparently
sought to exclude concerted activities of non-compliants from the
scope of statutory protection. Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act grants individual employees the right to engage
54. Initially non-complying unions argued unsuccessfully that their
status insulated them from decertification proceedings instituted by rivals
on the ground that such proceedings required non-complying unions' access
to board processes. But here the question of representation was not raised
by the non-complying union but by the party seeking its decertification.
Harris Foundry & Machine Co., 76 NLRB 118 (1948).
55. Bethlehem Steel Co., 79 NLRB 1271 (1948). Full participation assures
the non-compliant a place on the ballot, consideration of its objections to
any aspect of the proceeding on its merits (Univis Lens Co., 82 NLRB 1390
[1949]), and full freedom to campaign in behalf of its own election (Wood-
mark Industries, Inc., 80 NLRB 1105 [1948]).
56. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 78 NLRB 408 (1948).
57. NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C.A, § 159(c)(3) (Supp. 1951). Service Prod-
ucts Corp., Case No. 35-RC-386, Ad. Dec. of NLRB, CCH 10,245 (1950).
58. See discussion p. 414, supra.
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in self-organization and concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining. The specific content of Section 7 has been
developed in the mass of board cases charging employer inter-
ference with employee rights. Such interference violates Section
8 (a) (1) which makes it an unfair labor practice, subject to board
relief, for employers to "interfere with, restrain or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guararteed in Section 7. "59 Suc-
cessive provisions of Section 8 (a) make unlawful employer dom-
ination of a labor union and discrimination against union mem-
bers, and protect employees giving testimony under the act. 60
Finally, Section 8(a) (5) subjects an employer to unfair labor
practice prosecution upon his refusal to bargain collectively with
the chosen representatives of his employees.'1 Congressional
failure to qualify its grant of employee rights (and corresponding
remedial procedures for their enforcement) in light of sanctions
against 9 (h) non-compliance presaged the development of board
policy in the unfair labor practice cases. Here, as in the represen-
tation and decertification cases, mediation of statutory conflict
was its chief concern. For purposes of analysis, board cases aris-
ing out of alleged unfair labor practices of employers may be
separated into two groups: violation of individual employee
rights under Section 8(a) (1) (2) (3) and (4), and denial of the
right of employees' representatives to employer recognition under
8 (a) (5), a distinction adopted by the board in early cases raising
issues of Section 9(h) compliance.62
Relying upon a prior holding that Section 9 (h) is only appli-
cable to labor organizations, the board has reasoned that the affi-
davit requirement leaves unaffected the protection of rights statu-
torily created for individual employees in Section 7. Since Section
7 rights are protected by unfair labor practice provisions of Section
8 (a) (1) - (4), the board unanimously upheld 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3)
charges filed by individual employee-members of non-complying
unions.63 It has been consistently held immaterial that such indi-
viduals have been directly assisted by their non-complying unions
in the preparation and presentation of charges alleging violation
of individual rights.64 Union officers were permitted to prosecute
59. NLRB § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (1) (Supp. 1951).
60. NLRA § 8(a) (2), (3), (4), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (2), (3), (4) (Supp. 1951).
61. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(5) (Supp. 1951).
62. Marshall & Bruce Co., 75 NLRB 90 (1947); Pioneer Electric Co., 75
NLRB 117 (1947).
63. Andrews Co., 87 NLRB 379 (1949).
64. Globe Wireless Ltd., 88 NLRB 1262 (1950).
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unfair labor practice charges involving their own individual
rights even though, as officers, they had failed to file the required
affidavits. 65 The situations just mentioned have usually given
rise to contentions that the filing of individual charges consti-
tuted "fronting" for the complainant's non-complying union
which is denied board access. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in enforcing a board order, supported the board's posi-
tion that the protection of individual rights is unaffected by
Section 9 (h) and thus cannot provide an opportunity for circum-
vention of the affidavit requirement 6 The board has long held
it immaterial "that the [non-complying] union might derive an
incidental benefit from a finding that unfair labor practices were
committed." 67 Supporting the board, in stronger language, a
reviewing court commented that any benefit accruing to a labor
organization in granting such individual relief was, at most,
remote and unsubstantial.68
The board's literal rendition of both Section 9 (h) and the
unfair labor practice provisions of Section 8 (a) has created a
situation hardly foreseen by the drafters of the affidavit require-
ment. The removal of individual employees from the scope of
9 (h) proscriptions, coupled with the charter of individual rights
of Section 7, forced the board to depart from rigorous application
of fronting criteria to attempted utilization of NLRB processes
by individuals. The departure substantially defeated the 9 (h)
denial of unfair labor practice facilities to non-complying unions,
for the overwhelming number of alleged employer unfair labor
practices concern individual, as distinct from union, rights.6 9 The
statutory scheme developed to protect individual participation in
concerted activity regardless of union affiliation; but the end of
65. NLRB v. Clausen, 188 F. 2d 439 (3rd Cir. 1951).
66. NLRB v. Augusta Chemical Co., 187 F. 2d 63 (5th Cir. 1951).
67. Olin Industries, Inc., 86 NLRB 203 (1949).
68. NLRB v. Clausen, 188 F. 2d 439 (3rd Cir. 1951). Only one court of
appeals has denied enforcement of an order remedying an 8(a)(1) violation
on the ground that a complainant was fronting for his non-complying union.
But here the order was based on a complaint filed by the president of a non-
complying union which alleged employer interference with the rights of over
thirty employees, all members of his local union. Had each member filed a
separate complaint, the board would easily have gained enforcement of its
reinstatement and back pay order. See NLRB v. Alside, Inc., 20 CCH Lab.
Cases 1 66,645 (Nov. 26, 1951).
69. There were 4,472 cases showing specific allegations of employer unfair
labor practices filed with the board in 1950. These cases contained 8,353 alle-
gations of employer interference with "individual" employee rights, as com-
pared with 1,309 charges of employers' refusal to bargain with appropriate




all such activity has usually been the achievement of union
representation. Board critics argue that logical statutory con-
struction requires a contrary board policy.70 Such criticism over-
looks the basic dilemma presented in the unfair labor practice
cases. Section 9(h) sought to impede the collective bargaining
activities of Communist-led unions. It did not deny even Com-
munists the right to join a union or to participate in concerted
activities in its behalf. To interpret 9 (h) as barring 8 (a) (1) and
(3) charges would have left individual members of non-comply-
ing unions subject to loss of employment and employer reprisals.
But in protecting individual employee-members in their statutory
rights to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective
bargaining, the board necessarily protects the non-complying
union from employer obstacles to its organizational activities.
Reprisals against organizers are prevented by board reinstatement
and back-pay awards ordered in 8 (a) (3) proceedings. Since the
concerted activities of union members are prerequisite to the
union's ultimate demand for recognition, it is difficult to accept
the court's claim that the benefit derived by the non-compliant
from a finding of employer's unfair labor practice is, at most,
remote and unsubstantial. Employee-members of the union
remain protected in all of the activities which characterize the
gradual strengthening of the union; under the catch-all provision
of Section 8 (a) (1) the union indirectly obtains redress for em-
ployer misconduct literally denied it under the terms of 9 (h) .7oa
The second group of unfair labor practice cases concern
alleged violations of an employer's duty to recognize and bar-
gain with the chosen representatives of a majority of his
employees. In this regard the majority status of the union is
70. Kearns, supra note 43, at 310.
70a. The application of fronting criteria to individual unfair labor prac-
tice complaints demonstrates this dilemma. The employer permitted mem-
bers of a union to circulate petitions aimed at setting aside the election of a
rival union as exclusive bargaining agent. Upon employer's denial of similar
permission to members of a non-complying union which was barred from
participation in the election, individual members of the non-compliant filed
unfair labor practice charges. Upholding the employer's refusal, the court
reasoned that the complainants were unlawfully seeking in their individual
capacities to invoke board action with respect to a controversy to which
their non-compliant union was a party. Accordingly, the act did not require
the employer to permit his premises to be used for purposes in contraven-
tion of the act. In other words, certain employees, by virtue of membership
in a non-complying union, may lawfully be denied an opportunity to publicize
valid bases for setting aside the election of their exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative. Such a view is a substantial limitation upon the act's wide grant
of individual employee rights. Stewart-Warner Corp. v. NLRB, 4th Cir., 21
CCH Lab. Cases fT 66,674, Feb. 5, 1952.
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crucial, since the employer's duty to bargain does not arise until
the union's majority membership is established. The operation
of board policy in the cases just studied assists the non-comply-
ing labor organization. in preserving individual rights of its
members. The finding of an individual unfair labor practice is
also significant in evaluating the "refusal to bargain" cases.
Board policy safeguards the union itself since a loss of majority
status following the employer's commission of an unfair labor,
practice is generally attributed to the employer's unlawful con-
duct.7 1 The non-complying union which gains its majority is
always in the position to seek voluntary employer recognition
through economic coercion, thus bypassing NLRB processes.
But is the majority union able legally to require employer rec-
ognition in an 8(a) (5) proceeding if it has not achieved com-
pliance at the time of its demand? Since the act contains no
explicit derogation from the employer's duty to bargain with
a majority union regardless of its compliance status under Sec-
tion 9(h), the board has been forced to resolve this situation
as best it could.7 2
Marshall c Bruce Company73 arose out of a complaint filed
prior to the effective date of the Taft-Hartley Act, alleging em-
ployer's refusal to bargain with a certified union, a clear viola-
tion of both the original and amended NLRA. By the time the
case reached the board, Section 9 (h) was in full force and effect.
The remedial order which issues in such cases is clearly in the
nature of a mandatory injunction calling for affirmative action,
namely, bargaining. A majority of the board considered such
an order "often tantamount in practice to a certification .. as
bargaining representative," and since the board was clearly
forbidden to certify a non-complying union, the resulting order
in the Marshall c Bruce case was conditioned upon the com-
plainant's timely compliance with Section 9 (h).
Minority board members considered the conditional nature
of the order unwarranted by the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as a whole, since it permitted employer deroga-
71. West Texas Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 184 F. 2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1950), and
cases cited therein.
72. In the reverse situation, the union's refusal to bargain with the
employer in violation of Section 8(b)(3), the board ordered non-compliants to
bargain collectively with the employer, but only upon employer's request,
thus minimizing the effect of such order in strengthening the union's
bargaining position. National Maritime Union, 78 NLRB 971 (1948); Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 81 NLRB 1052 (1949).
73. 75 NLRB 90 (1947).
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tion of a public right created by the certificate so long as the
union remained out of compliance. They argued that Congress
sought to solve problems presented by Communist leadership in
labor unions by "erecting certain procedural barriers" while the
substantive emphasis of the act encouraged strengthening the
institution of collective bargaining.
The Marshall & Bruce case foretold the result of Andrews
Company7 4 which arose after Section 9 (h) had become effective.
The union had demanded recognition prior to its compliance
and was refused. Upon achieving compliance the union filed an
8 (a) (5) charge against the employer. A majority of the board
dismissed the complaint, although absent union's non-compliance
at the time of the demand, they would have found an 8 (a) (5)
violation. The majority reasoned that since the statute created
the right of exclusive representation and then forbade certifica-
tion of non-complying unions, "a limitation on the remedy 'is
to be treated as a limitation on the right itself." The dissenters
again denied that Section 9(h) affected the substantive empha-
sis of the amended act.
The Andrews rule was reversed by the board in the follow-
ing year, indicating the influence of an intervening dictum of
the court of appeals in West Texas Utilities Company v. NLRB.7 5
Section 9(h) provides, in part, non-access to NLRB facilities
"unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed
contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month
period." Criticizing the result of the Andrews case, the court
reasoned that "contemporaneously" implied that the unfair
labor practice occurred prior to the filing of an affidavit. Thus
a complying union may invoke board processes to remedy
employer's wrongful refusal to bargain at a time prior to union
compliance. Section 9(h) was held not to relieve an employer
of the paramount obligation to bargain collectively in good faith.
The act's only sanction for non-compliance is denial of board
facilities. Thus enforced, the court's "procedural" interpretation
of Section 9(h), urged by minority members in the Marshall &
Bruce and Andrews cases, was established by the board, two
members dissenting, in New Jersey Carpet Mills, Inc.7 6
74. 87 NLRB 379 (1949). Cf. Comment, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 783, 786, n. 26(1951).
75. 184 F. 2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
76. 92 NLRB, No. 122 (1950). Cf. Tennessee Egg Co., 93 NLRB, No. 846
(1951), wherein the board unanimously affirmed the New Jersey Carpet rule.
The board thus reversed Its trial examiner who, in reliance upon Marshall &
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Chairman Herzog, speaking only for himself in one part of
the majority opinion, suggested that he would have dismissed
the complaint had the employer contemporaneously notified the
union that his refusal to bargain was based on the union's non-
compliance. Such a position, he argued, would be consistent
with both the basic principle of collective bargaining and board
encouragement of union compliance. Although Chairman Herzog
speaks alone, it seems obvious that his position would be decisive
in the situation he envisions, considering the 3-2 lineup in the
New Jersey Carpet case. His view is noteworthy, for it is the
only one which seeks a solution to the mystery of congressional
intent by explicit compromise between conflicting statutory
provisions." Chairman Herzog's own elaboration of the com-
promise position suggests reliance upon employer motivation,
thus placing a premium upon the employer's sophistication in
publicizing his refusal to bargain. 78 In so complicating the rule's
application much of the value of compromise is dissipated. More
important, the court's procedural construction, now adopted by
the board, finds strong support in the language of the sub-
section. "Contemporaneously" requires that the act complained
of occur prior to compliance. Since, under prior statutory con-
struction, the only unfair labor practice for which unions qua
unions seek redress are employer refusals to bargain in violation
of Section 8(a) (5), this must be the act contemplated by Sec-
tion 9(h). Conversely, acceptance of the substantive view that
the act does not later punish employers' refusal to bargain with
a majority non-compliant renders meaningless the subsection's
sanction that "no complaint shall be issued" until the union
complies.
As with the individual unfair labor practice cases, the
board's resolution of the conflict between employee rights and
non-compliant disabilities in the refusal-to-bargain cases greatly
Bruce, stated, "If the Board would not require an employer to bargain with
the Union during a period of non-compliance, I cannot see how an employer
later may be held chargeable for an unfair labor practice for not doing that
which he would not then have been legally required to do."
77. "While the 'substantive' rule attempts to solve the conflict between
the intent behind Section .9(h) and the over-all objectives of the Act by
giving effect in all cases to the former, the 'procedural' rule recognizes the
latter as paramount. The Herzog rule is an attempt to compromise between
these extremes. Under that rule, no important sacrifice of the Act's broader
objectives need be made, since the intent behind Section 9(h) will be effectu-
ated only where the employer's conduct is consistent with his acceptance
ot the collective bargaining principle." Comment, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 783,
789 (1951).
78. Tennessee Egg Co., 93 NLRB, No. 846, n. 13 (1951).
[VOL. XII
NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVITS
ameliorates the consequences of non-compliance. The employ-
er's statutory duty to bargain arises upon proof that a majority
of his employees have selected the union. Although the non-
complying union is denied board certification of majority status,
such a showing may be made informally by stipulated agree-
ment, union membership lists, or strikers' roll, procedures that
do not require union access to board facilities. 7 9 Having estab-
lished its majority status the non-compliant lacks only the
ability to enforce its right to recognition in a board proceeding.
This sanction seems hardly sufficient since as the Andrews
majority recognized, a non-complying union could compel recog-
nition by the mere threat of subsequent compliance and filing
of an 8 (a) (5) unfair labor practice charge against an employer.80
Faced with the prospect of a future unfair labor practice com-
plaint, an employer will probably be more concerned with the
economic alignment of rival unions than their compliance
status. The New Jersey Carpet case has fashioned a weapon
with which the majority non-complying union can support its
demands for voluntary employer recognition, thereby defeating
the superficially onerous proscriptions of Section 9(h).
COMMUNISM AND LABOR UNIONS
The board cannot be censured for ineptitude of legislative
drafting. Nor is it subject to criticism for the ramifications of
policies embodying multiple intents, no one of which is deter-
minative in the crucial area of conflict. Had the board's early
appreciation that employers' voluntary recognition is often tanta-
mount to NLRB certification been shared by the drafters of Sec-
tion 9 (h), the basic weakness of an affidavit requirement might
have been foreseen.
Examination of board policy supports the conclusion that
Section 9 (h) has been largely ineffective in lessening the impact
of Communist-led unions upon labor-management relationss "a
Two other areas, intra-union political activity and union com-
pliance conduct, appear to corroborate this contention. Although
Communist leadership in the labor movement has declined
79. Consult CCH T 3080.
80. Andrews Co., 87 NLRB 379, 383 (1949). The union Is under no duty to
renew its request for recognition after it achieves compliance. I. B. S. Manu-
facturing Co., 96 NLRB, No. 200, CCH U 11,216 (1951).
80a. For a contrary view that the increasing pressure exerted by NLRB
administration of Section 9(h) has resulted in sophisticated techniques of
evasion which threatens the! subsection's continuing effectiveness, see State-
ment of NLRB, op. cit. supra note 13.
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markedly in the years following the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act, it is probably true, as one commentator claims,
that the non-Communist affidavit requirement has had slight
influence on this trend. "[I]f the provision in question had
never been enacted, the CIO, nevertheless, would have taken
substantially the same action that it has. Issues such as the
Marshall Plan, third-party politics, the union's international
affiliations, presently, the Korean crisis would have made it
impossible to tolerate the conduct of the leftists-regardless of
the enactment of the non-Communist provision. Third, and con-
versely, in no instance was the CIO's expulsion of a union based
upon that union's refusal to comply with the affidavit require-
ment; in fact, most of those unions had come into. compliance
prior to their expulsion from the parent union. In short, the
conduct of the CIO is to be explained by something more fun-
damental than the mere enactment of a piece of legislation. Its
conduct is a reflection of the deterioration of this nation's rela-
tions with Russia. 81 It is significant that the CIO has not been
satisfied with the mere execution of the Taft-Hartley affidavits.
Opponents of left-wing union leadership have clearly rejected
reliance upon a provision which Congress offered as a weapon
in intra-union political struggles. Their conduct demonstrates
that defection of politically undesirable forces in the labor
movement cannot be accomplished by such simple statutory
devices. On the other hand, the compliance conduct of unions
indicates their own appreciation of the ineffectiveness of Section
9 (h). On June 30, 1951, 15,678 local unions were in compliance
with the affidavit requirement. But approximately ten thou-
sand additional local unions which had complied in prior years
had allowed their compliance to lapse.8 2 The magnitude of the
lapse statistics indicates that large numbers of local unions who
have no association with Communism have found it unnecessary
to maintain observance of the act's requirements. This fact seri-
81. Levinson, supra note 13, at 1089-90.
82. COMPLIANCE WITH 9(h) REQUIREMENT
Local Unions in Local Unions Whose
Full Compliance Compliance Has Lapsed
Affiliation Unions Affidavits Unions Affidavits
A F of L ............. 9,408 85,375 5,988 57,302
C I 0 ................. 4,700 39,327 2,448 24,233
Independent .......... 1,570 12,263 1,563 10,920
TOTAL ............. 15,678 136,965 9,999 92,455
Source: NLRB Affidavit Compliance Branch, Monthly Report of Compli-
ance for Month Ending June 30, 1951.
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ously challenges the complacency of those legislators who en-
vision Section 9(h) as a means of driving Communism out of
the labor movement.
On another front, congressional action suggests current
efforts to meet the threat of Communist activity in the labor
movement with new legislation.88 Earlier efforts in the Demo-
cratic Eighty-first Congress to amend the Taft-Hartley Act
attempted to delete the affidavit requirement. Shortly after the
bill's introduction a revised Section 9(h) was inserted.8 4 This
acceptance of non-Communist affidavits as a continuing feature
of labor-management legislation must not go unchallenged.
Exposure of the impotency of Section 9(h) as a means of
social control does not exhaust concern with its role. in indus-
trial relations. Legislation often plays a dual role; it is both a
substantive regulation and the expression of a policy which
itself influences public opinion. Enactment of the affidavits
requirement highlighted public disapproval of Communist-led
unions. To the extent that this disapproval was successfully
exploited by employers and rivals to weaken such unions, Sec-
tion 9(h) has been useful legislation.
Three alternatives follow: Retention of the present opinion-
forming subsection; substantive regulation of politically suspect
unions; and removal of any reference to such unions from the
statutory scheme. Evidence of 9(h) influence upon public opin-
ion is negligible and hardly susceptible to rigorous examination.
On the other hand, experience under the present subsection
suggests the difficulty of effective control without resort to
drastic techniques which would jeopardize individual employee
security as well as collective action. The third alternative, in
effect, recognizes that evils attendant on Communist domina-
tion of labor unions can be remedied solely by private citizens
and alert unionists. The recent rapid decline of Communist
influence in the labor movement, cited above, lends credence to
this contention. However, in the last analysis, a choice among
alternatives will be determined by one's assumptions as to a
democratic labor movement's ability to successfully absorb a
revolutionary force which seeks its destruction. In a generalized
83. Senator Humphrey (D., Minn.) currently heads a Senate subcommittee
which is investigating the extent to which Communist-controlled unions are
in a position to endanger the defense effort. Consult Communist Domination
of Certain Unions, Sen. Doc. No. 89, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 19, 1951).
84. Shair, supra note 13, at 944.
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form this has been a problem confronting all democratic soci-
eties. Because it is both persistent and difficult, effort must be
expended in sincere and enlightened deliberation. The exposure
of Section 9(h)'s failure as a regulatory technique is merely a
prelude to the enigma of fashioning effective public policy in
this area.85
85. "Essentially, communism's role in labor organizations is much more a
part of the problem of communism's place on the entire American scene
than it is part of the problem of labor-management relations. It should be
dealt with accordingly." Statement of NLRB, op. cit. supra note 13.
